Experts and Freedom in the Libertarian Paternalism
Keywords:
libertarian paternalism, nudge, technocracy, freedom, cognitive biasAbstract
This work pretends to analyze and criticize the idea of libertarian paternalism advocated in recent years by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler. This political project with technocratic character proposed that an elite of experts performs a modification in the individuals’ environment of decision to influence in a controlled manner their behavior, thereby improving the consequences of their actions. The first part of the article will present some of the objections that the libertarian paternalism has received so far. The second will consider a review of different critics from those already developed. This will point that the idea of freedom defended by the libertarian paternalism, that is, the individual’s ability to choose what you want between a big enough range of alternatives is too weak. This is because it only ensures that the election has been conducted without coercion, and disregards the fact that ignorance of the scheduled influences by experts assumed an epistemic deficit that affects the liberty of the subject.
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